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Passwords Please: Rethinking the
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy
in the Context of Social Media
by SARA E. STRATTON*
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'
Introduction
Imagine interviewing for your dream job. You do so well during
the interview that you are immediately offered the position.
However, there is one stipulation attached to your offer: You must
divulge your social media usernames and passwords so the employer
can conduct a search of your personal social media accounts. While
this hypothetical situation may seem surprising, there have been
several recent reports of employers and universities requesting
applicants' social media information.2 Although the pervasiveness of
this practice is not widely known,3 the response from some state and
federal legislators indicates resistance to this type of conduct.
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2010, San Diego State University, Political Science. I would like to thank Professor Lois
Schwartz for her guidance throughout the writing process. In addition, I would like to
thank the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for refining and fine-tuning
this Note. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their continued love, support, and
inspiration.
1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
2. See infra pp. 2-3.
3. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, United States Senator for New York,
Blumenthal, Schumer: Employer Demands for Facebook and Email Passwords as
Precondition for Job Interviews May be a Violation of Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds to
Investigate (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.
cfm?id=336396. United States Senators Charles Schumer and Richard Blumenthal "called
on the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to launch a federal investigation into a new disturbing
trend of employers demanding job applicants turn over their user names and passwords
for social networking and email websites to gain access to personal information like
[649]
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Attention surrounding social media privacy and the workplace
began when the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") protested
a practice by Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services ("DOC") in 2010.4 Robert Collins, a Corrections Supply
Officer with the DOC, approached the ACLU asserting that he was
bothered by a DOC' practice requiring him to provide his Facebook'
login information and password during a recertification interview.
Collins was hired to work at the DOC in 2007 and took a personal
leave of absence in April of 2010. Upon returning to work in July
2010, Collins discovered that his position had been reassigned.
Before he could be placed in another position, DOC policy required
Collins to go through a recertification process.o The process included
fingerprinting, another background check, and interview." During
Collins' interview on December 1, 2010, the interviewer asked if he
used social media websites; Collins replied that he used Facebook.12
The interviewer then directed Collins to divulge his username and
password to permit the "government to review wall postings, email
communications, photographs, and friend lists, in order to ensure that
those employed as corrections officers are not engaged in illegal
activity or affiliated with any gangs."" Collins then asked the Officer
how long the DOC would need the information. 4 The interviewer
responded that background checks could take up to one or two
months, and that the DOC would likely use the information again
during that time period."
private photos, email messages, and biographical data that is otherwise deemed private."
Id.
4. Melissa C. Goemann, Maryland Passes Nation's First Social Media Privacy
Protection Bill, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (May 4, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog
/technology-and-liberty/maryland-passes-nations-first-social-media-privacy-protection-bill.
5. Id.
6. See infra pp. 5-7.
7. Meredith Curtis, Want A Job? Password, Please!, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Feb. 18,
2011, 2:04 p.m.), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/want-job-password-please.
8. Letter from Deborah A. Jeon, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., to










In addition to the story of Officer Collins, there have been
several reports of this practice across the United States. For instance,
Justin Bassett, a statistician from New York City, had finished an
interview and was asked to "hand over his Facebook login
information after the interviewer couldn't locate his profile on the
site."" In addition, the City of Bozeman, Montana, required its job
applicants to disclose a variety of personal information, including
social media passwords to websites like Facebook." The specific
language on the application states: "Please, list any and all, current
personal or business websites, web pages or memberships on any
Internet-based chat rooms, social clubs or forums, to include, but not
limited to: Facebook, Google, Yahoo, YouTube.com, MySpace,
etc."18  As such, the application has designations for "Username/
Member Log-In" and "Password.""
This Note contends that the practice of the Maryland DOC, in
addition to any similar practices conducted by public employers
requiring applicant social media login information, violates the
constitutional right to informational privacy. With increasing access
to the Internet and the popularity of social media, personal
information on the Internet is becoming more accessible than ever
before. Although the advent of the Internet may have been a cause
for privacy concerns,20 the pervasive use of social media and the
extensive amount of information many individuals disclose about
their personal lives only exacerbates the problem.2 1
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should recognize a
constitutional right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The scope of this
Note is relatively narrow, as it specifically addresses the issues
surrounding employer access to social media policies in order to
16. Joanna Stem, Demanding Facebook Passwords May Break Law, Say Senators,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/facebook-passwords-
employers-schools-demand-access-facebook-senators/story?id=16005565.
17. Kelly Phillips, Are Social Media Passwords Fair Game for Potential Employers?,
ERBLAWG (June 24, 2009), http://www.erblawg.com/are-social-media-passwords-fair-
game-for-potential-employers/.
18. CITY OF BOZEMAN, MONTANA, CONSENT AND RELEASE TO CONDUCT
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND AND REFERENCE CHECK, available at http://privacy.org/
BackgroundCheckFormInterviewMASTER.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,2014).
19. Id.
20. See generally Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the
Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2002).
21. See infra p. 8.
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highlight the debate around constitutional informational privacy
rights.22 Further, this Note is limited to protection of public employee
information against governmental action.23 Finally, this Note asserts
the need for the Supreme Court to recognize the right to
informational privacy from a substantive due process perspective
under the Fourteenth Amendment and does not focus on privacy
under the Fourth Amendment24 or First Amendment.25
Part I provides background information on social media
websites. Specifically, it examines the Facebook social networking
website and the privacy interests that could be implicated if forced
disclosure is required by government employers.
Part II discusses proposed state, federal, and constitutional
solutions to the problem of employers requesting applicant social
media usernames and passwords. First, this section addresses the
inadequacy of a state response to this problem. Second, it discusses
the deficiency of a federal legislative solution by examining the
federal government's proposed bill, the Social Networking Online
Protection Act ("SNOPA"), and other federal laws. Finally, this
section addresses the constitutional background of the right to
privacy and explores the right's ambiguous nature. This section will
explain the Supreme Court's limited development of the information
privacy doctrine, and will highlight the circuit court split in the area of
informational privacy.
22. Current laws are combating forced disclosures for employment applicants and
prospective university students. This Note, however, primarily focuses on employment
applicants.
23. The Supreme Court's recognition of the right to privacy only protects public
employees against government action. Private actors are not included. See Kevin C.
McAdam & John R. Webb, Privacy: A Common Law and Constitutional Crossroads, 40
COLO. LAW. 55 (2011). Only in limited circumstances have private sector employees been
afforded constitutional protections. For instance, when a private employer acts as an
agent of the government. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)
(holding that private sector employees were entitled to First Amendment protections
when the employer was heavily intertwined with the government).
24. Although not discussed in this Note, the Supreme Court has recognized that
public employees are entitled to Fourth Amendment privacy protections. The Court
applies a two-prong test, which first assesses whether the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716-18 (1987), aff'd, City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2622-23 (2010). If the expectation of privacy was
reasonable, the Court then assesses whether the search was reasonable under the
circumstances. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 719; Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628.
25. The Supreme Court has also noted that the First Amendment protects publishing
the name of a rape victim obtained from a public police report. The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524,526 (1989).
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Part III concludes that the best solution to address social media
privacy concerns for employment applicants-at least in terms of
state action-is for the Supreme Court to recognize a constitutional
right to informational privacy through substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, this Note argues that the
Court should employ the "reasonable expectation of privacy
approach" to determine whether a right to privacy should apply and
then utilize the balancing test developed by the Third Circuit in
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." to determine whether
the right to privacy is outweighed by the government's interest in
disclosure."
I. The Social Media Problem
Social media refers to user-driven, interactive Internet
applications that allow for the creation and exchange of user-
generated content.28 There is a wide range of social media
applications, including collaborative projects,29  blogs,3 content
communities," social networks,32 and virtual worlds.3 ' Because of the
26. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 578.
28. Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the world, unite! The
challenges and opportunities of Social Media, 53 Bus. HORIZONs 59, 59-62 (2010),
available at http://michaelhaenlein.com/Publications/Kaplan,%20Andreas%20-%20Users
%20of%20the%20world,%20unite.pdf.
29. "Collaborative projects enable the joint and simultaneous creation of content by
many end-users and are, in this sense, probably the most democratic manifestation of [user-
generated content]." Id. at 62. Wikipedia is an example of a collaborative project. Id.
30. Blogs "are the Social Media equivalent of personal web pages and can come in a
multitude of different variations .... Blogs are usually managed by one person only, but
provide the possibility of interaction with others through the addition of comments." Id. at 63.
31. The purpose of content communities is to share media between users. Id. Flickr
(a photo-sharing website) and YouTube (a video-sharing website) are examples of content
communities. Id.
32. "Social networking sites are applications that enable users to connect by creating
personal information profiles, inviting friends and colleagues to have access to those
profiles, and sending e-mails and instant messages between each other." Id. Facebook
and MySpace are examples of social networks. Id. at 63-64.
33. "Virtual worlds are platforms that replicate a three-dimensional environment in
which users can appear in the form of personalized avatars and interact with each other as
they would in real life." Id. at 64. There are two types of virtual worlds: virtual game
worlds and virtual social worlds. Id. Virtual game worlds "require their users to behave
according to strict rules in the context of a massively multiplayer online role-playing
game." Id. World of Warcraft is an example of a virtual game world. Id. Conversely,
virtual social worlds "allows inhabitants to choose their behavior more freely and
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added sharing component of online interaction, social media differs
from other methods of online communication, such as emailing or
instant messaging. Individuals typically use social media for
storage5 and connecting with others. 6  As of December 2013, the
most notable social media networks are Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln,
Pinterest, and Instagram.37
Although all forms of social media contain user-specific
information that might implicate privacy concerns, this Note focuses
specifically on the Facebook social networking website in order to
narrow the scope of the discussion. Facebook is the largest and most
widely accessed social networking site in the world. 38  Sixty-seven
percent of American adults use Facebook.3 9  As of December 2012,
Facebook had over one billion users internationally, 618 million daily
active users, and 680 million monthly active users accessing Facebook
mobile products."
In addition to being the most widely accessed social networking
site, Facebook allows users to post a vast amount of information on
their Facebook profiles. 41 The following information is available on a
fully disclosed Facebook profile: work and education, schooling,
address, relationship status, family members, email address,
telephone numbers, street address, screen name, political views,
essentially live a virtual life similar to their real life .... [Tihere are no rules restricting the
range of possible interactions except for basic physical laws such as gravity." Id.
34. See Alexander Naito, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying
Constitutional Privacy Protection to Employees' Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
849, 860 (2012).
35. See Peter Vajgel, Needle in a haystack: efficient storage of billions of photos,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 30, 2009, 2:27 PM), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?noteid=
76191543919.
36. See generally People You May Know, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/501283333222485/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
37. See Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Social Media Update 2013, PEW INTERNET
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/.
38. Social Media Report 2012: Social Media Comes of Age, NIELSON (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2012/social-media-report-2012-social-media-comes
-of-age.html.
39. Maeve Duggan & Joanna Brenner, The State of Social Media Users, PEW
INTERNET (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Social-media-users/
The-State-of-Social-Media-Users.aspx.
40. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Mar. 2,2014).
41. See Facebook & your privacy, CONSUMER REPORTS (June 2012), http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/06/facebook-your privacy/index.htm.
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religious views, and language spoken.4 2 In addition to basic personal
information, Facebook allows users to upload pictures, videos, post
comments on other profiles, send email-like messages, and instant
message. Users can also make status updates43 and "check-in" to
locations in order to share information about where they are going or
what they are doing." The "check-in" option enables other users to
view one's location.45 Facebook users even have the option of
disclosing their organ donor status.46
Facebook has various privacy options available for its users.47 In
order to use Facebook, a user must sign up, disclose his or her "name,
birthday, gender and email address," and provide a password. 48 To
log in to the Facebook account thereafter, users must enter the
username and password they used to originally sign up.49 Once logged
into the account, users can set their profiles to either "public," where
any individual on the Internet can access their account, or "private,"
where only "friends"o can view the user's information. There are also
customized options available where users can restrict access of
pictures, messages, and postings to specific individuals." Users can
vary their access between completely private, semi-private, and
public.52
42. Update Your Basic Info, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
334656726616576/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
43. Sharing, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/helpl418076994900119/ (last
visited Mar. 2,2014).
44. Find Places Nearby and Check In, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
461075590584469 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Share Your Organ Donor Status, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
416967021677693/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
47. Privacy concerns on Facebook are often a topic of discussion in the news media.
See Rosa Golijan, Consumer Reports: Facebook privacy problems are on the rise, NBC
NEWS (May 3, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/consumer-reports-
facebook-privacy-problems-are-rise-749990.
48. Create an Account, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/345121355559712/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
49. Login Basics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/418876994823287/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014).
50. A friend is another Facebook user who the primary user authorizes to access
their personal profile. See generally Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/360212094049906/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
51. See generally Choose Who You Share With, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.
com/help/459934584025324/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
52. See Naito, supra note 34, at 859-60.
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Facebook has also provided avenues for third-party access to
personal profile information through "games" and "applications."
Whenever a user authorizes a game or an application, the application
can often access information such as a user's name, picture, gender
and list of friends.54 In some instances, applications can see even
more data if a user grants that application permission." Furthermore,
some third-party applications provide options for users to purchase
items from the provider. Facebook enables users to store credit and
debit card information on their accounts."
The vast amount of easily accessible personal information is a
problem with social media. There has been a transformation from
strictly static, independent websites to a platform of interconnected
social media websites-popularly referred to as Web 2.0. Web 2.0
has caused a proliferation of personal disclosures that individuals
might not otherwise feel comfortable disclosing through other
methods of communication." In a study conducted by Carnegie
Mellon University, researchers hypothesized that Facebook users
have increased the amount of personal disclosures on their profiles
53. See All Games, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/appcenter/category/
games/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); Apps, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
appcenter/category/apps/?platform=web (last visited Mar. 16, 2014); see also King
Games-Terms and Conditions, KING, http://about.king.com/consumer-terms/terms/en
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (explaining that they "will only collect, process, use and share
your personal information in accordance with our Privacy Policy and as set out in these
terms.") (emphasis added).
54. Whenever a user connects to an application, game or website using their
Facebook account, Facebook will provide the application information from the user's
"public profile" and friend list. See Data Use Policy: Other Websites and Applications,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-other#applications
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014). Under the definition of "public profile," Facebook treats a
user's "name, profile pictures, cover photos, gender, networks, username and User ID" as
if they were public information. Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It Is
Used, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#public-info (last
visited Mar. 16, 2014).
55. See Data Use Policy: Other Websites and Applications, supra note 54 (explaining
how users can grant applications more permission to view information, such as stories,
photos, or likes).
56. See Facebook Payments, FACEBOOK, http://developers.facebook.com/docs/
payments/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
57. Credit/Debit Cards, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/359291094142663
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
58. Rory Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and
Utopian Civil Justice, 79 Miss. L.J. 317, 347 (2009).
59. Id. (highlighting a situation where bloggers often use their online blogs to "come
out" of the closet).
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for at least four reasons.6 First, Facebook increased the number of
fields in which users can enter personal disclosures. Second,
Facebook enabled sharing options allowing users to regularly share
changing information as opposed to simply displaying static
information.62 For instance, users are now able to share information
through chatting and messaging with their friends (the "share
option") rather than simply being restricted to displaying static
information like names, email addresses, and birthdates. Facebook
profiles have shifted from showing static information to hosting
"'habitats' through which new information is frequently created ...
by virtue of interacting with others (users, companies, sites) through
the network."6  Third, the data generated by new third-party
applications can be posted to Facebook users' profiles." Finally,
"friends" of the Facebook user are now allowed to add more
information about the user on the user's profile, such as photographs
depicting the user.
The expansive amount of information available about users on
social media websites is further complicated in the context of
employment. While social media websites, such as Facebook, are
valuable tools for users to keep in touch with friends and family
members,6 they are also advantageous for employers and universities
who utilize such websites as part of the applicant prescreening
process.67 Many employers and universities run criminal background
checks on prospective employees and students, and general Google6 1
60. Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The
Evolution of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. OF PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY
7, 26-27 (2012), available at http://repository.cmu.edu/jpc/vol4/iss2/2/ (select "Download").
61. Id. at 26.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 27.
65. Id. at 28.
66. A study conducted by Pew Internet found that Internet users' primary purpose
for using social networking websites includes connecting with friends and family. Other
reasons were sharing hobbies or interests, making new friends, reading comments by
public figures, and finding potential love interests. Aaron Smith, Why Americans use
social media, PEW INTERNET (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/
Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx.
67. See generally Ian Byrnside, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of
Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10 VAND J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 445, 448-60 (2008).
68. See Allan Hoffman, Job Applicant, Beware: You're Being Googled, MONSTER,
http://career-advice.monster.com/job-search/getting-started/hr-googling-job-applicants/
article.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). See also Byrnside, supra note 67, at 458.
and social media searches69 are commonly utilized. Many employers
search the public profiles of individuals on Facebook, MySpace, or
Linkedln to acquire additional information about their applicants.
Employers even hire outside companies to perform social media
background checks.0
An example of a social media application that could implicate
privacy concerns if accessed by an employer is the "Down"
application on Facebook. According to the application's website, its
purpose is to enable users to anonymously "find friends who are
down for the night""-in other words, to locate Facebook "friends"
who mutually want to have sexual relations with each other. Pursuant
to the website, three steps are required to use the application: (1) the
user signs into Facebook in order to see other Facebook friends who
have also downloaded the application; (2) the user then selects any
"sexy" Facebook friends who the user would like to have sex with or
date; and then, (3) the application sends a notification to the user and
"friend" if they mutually decide they want to have sexual relations
with each other or go out on a date.72 Users who access the
application manage it directly from their Facebook pages. The "Bang
with Friends" application was reported in January 2013 to have had
roughly 30,000 users since it launched earlier that month." Although
it was initially provided only for heterosexuals, the application's
creators planned a "same-sex" option for its users.7 As discussed
infra, constitutional issues may arise when government employers
become privy to employees' sexual preferences.
69. See Jocelyn Richard, 37 Percent Of Employers Use Facebook To Pre-Screen
Applicants, New Study Says, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 20, 2012, 3:13 P.M.),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/20/employers-use-facebook-to-pre-screen-applic
ants_n_1441289.html.
70. See, e.g., SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://www.socialintel.com/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2014).
71. DowN, http://www.downapp.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
72. Id.
73. Anita Li, Bang With Friends Sex App Registers 5 Users Per Minute, MASHABLE
(Jan. 29, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/01/29/bang-with-friends/.
74. Id.
75. Some circuit courts have found that intrusions into areas that implicate
"fundamental rights" under Supreme Court jurisprudence should receive constitutional
informational privacy protection. See infra pp. 674-75.
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H. Finding a Solution to the Social Media Problem
The practice of employers requesting applicants' social media
information raises significant privacy concerns. In response to this
practice, several states have passed social media protection laws
prohibiting this type of employer conduct. The federal government is
considering a proposed bill-SNOPA-to rectify this problem.
However, as the following discussion will illuminate, state and federal
responses are insufficient to protect individual privacy rights. Thus,
in order to provide more complete protection for public employee
information, a constitutional solution is necessary: The U.S. Supreme
Court should recognize a constitutional right to informational
privacy.
a. State Efforts are Incomplete Solutions to Resolving Constitutional
Privacy Rights
The rise in reports of employers requesting applicant social
media usernames and passwords has compelled several state
legislatures to enact social media protection laws. As of March 2014,
only fourteen states-Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey,
Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington-have enacted legislation
protecting employee or student applicants from being compelled to
disclose social media usernames and passwords." This section will
distinguish the Maryland, Illinois, and California laws to highlight the
various approaches states are taking to address this contentious
practice.
Maryland was the first state to enact a law protecting employees
from disclosing social media login information. The Maryland law,
codified at section 3-712 of the Labor and Employment Code, was
prompted after Officer Collins' allegations about the DOC's policy
requesting his Facebook username and password.7 ' The law covers
private businesses and state and local governments. 9 The law
prohibits employers from "request[ing] or requir[ing] that an
76. See Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-
and-information-technologyemployer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014) (click on "2013 Legislation" to access a summary of legislation passed
in 2013; and click on "2012 Legislation" to access a summary of legislation passed in 2012).
77. See Goemann, supra note 4; see also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (2012).
78. See Curtis, supra note 7.
79. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712(a)(4)(i)(1)-(2).
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employee or applicant disclose any user name, password, or other
means for accessing a personal account or service through an
electronic communications device."" However, there is an exception
that permits the employer to require the employee to disclose the
username and password to access nonpersonal information in the
work computer." Further, employers are permitted to investigate
employees to ensure compliance with financial laws and regulatory
requirements.82 The language of section 3-712 is fairly expansive, as it
prohibits requiring any disclosure of any personal account. Thus, the
law broadly prohibits employer access to personal information
relating not only to Facebook or other social networking sites, but
also to electronic communication accounts and services, which can
presumably include email. This makes the law inclusive and
protective of employee and applicant privacy.
Illinois has enacted a social media law that is both narrower and
broader than the Maryland law." The Illinois law prohibits
employers from "request[ing] or requir[ing] any employee or
prospective employee to provide any password or other related
account information in order to gain access to the employee's ...
account or profile on a social networking website or to demand access
in any manner. . . ." The law also allows employers to create
policies regarding Internet use, monitor workplace electronic
equipment, and obtain information available in the public domain.
Unlike the Maryland law, the Illinois law is broader because it is only
restricted to "social networking" websites.6 Such social networking
websites are defined, under this law, as services that allow users to
"connect" with others and do not include electronic mail.8 ' The
"connection" requirement may, therefore, preclude application to
other social media, such as blogs. Presumably, since the law prohibits
"gain[ing] access" to accounts, the law would cover "over-the-
shoulder" surfing of social-networking accounts (i.e., asking an
80. Id. at § 3-712(b)(1) (emphasis added).
81. Id. at § 3-712(b)(2).
82. Id. at § 3-712(e)(1).
83. Compare MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712, with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
55/10 (2013).
84. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/10(b)(1) (2013).
85. Id. at § 55/10(b)(2)(A)-(B) & (b)(3).
86. Compare MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712, with 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
55/10. It does not appear that it would apply to email or blogs, as these are not considered
"social networking" websites.
87. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/10(b)(4) (2013).
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employee or applicant to log into his social media account to allow
the employer to view his social media profile "over his shoulder"),
and asking others with access to the account to login so that the
employer can conduct a search. Furthermore, the law is narrower
because it does not provide any exceptions for workplace
investigations nor does the law apply to electronic mail.'
California has also enacted two social media laws targeting
public and private universities, as well as private employers.8 The
California legislature is currently considering amending the law to
include public employers.' Codified at section 980 of the California
Labor Code, the law prevents employers from "requir[ing] or
request[ing] an employee or applicant [to] ... disclose a username or
password for the purpose of accessing personal social media,"
"[a]ccess[ing] personal social media in the presence of the employer,"
or "[divulging] any personal social media."91 However, the law also
takes employer's interests into account by permitting disclosure if the
employer "reasonably believe[s] [it is] ... relevant to an investigation
of allegations of employee misconduct or employee violation of
applicable laws and regulations" so long as the social media is only
used in relation to the investigation.9 The law further permits
disclosure of "a username, password, or other method for the purpose
of accessing an employer-issued electronic device."93 California's law
differs from Maryland and Illinois in that it takes a more balanced
approach to address employer interests. It protects employers by
applying a reasonable belief standard for employer conduct, allowing
for instances in which password disclosure is permitted.94 Thus, this
law appears to give employers more discretion in accessing employee
personal login information and, as a result, provides less security for
employees and applicants.
Based on these state laws protecting applicants from divulging
social media usernames and passwords to potential employers, it
would seem that state legislation would be sufficient to regulate this
88. See id.
89. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2013); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120 (2013).
90. See A.B. 25, at 1 (Cal. 2014), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill
NavClient.xhtml?bill id=201320140AB25#.
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b) (2013).
92. Id. at § 980(c).
93. Id. at § 980(d).
94. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c) (2013) (explaining that employers can request
social media passwords if it is related "to an investigation of allegations of employee
misconduct or employee violation of applicable laws and regulations.").
Spring 2014] PASSWORDS PLEASE 661
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
conduct and protect constitutional privacy interests. The current
protection, however, is insufficient. First, not all states have laws
prohibiting this practice, though many states have responded quickly
to address this issue." Second, Delaware's law only protects
applicants applying for admission into a university, not applicants
applying for employment. 96 Third, California's law only protects
applicants to private employment, not applicants to public
employment. Finally, the provided level of protection may not
necessarily be adequate. Illinois, for instance, only protects
applicants from being forced to disclose social networking passwords,
leaving open the possibility of employers being permitted to request
usernames and passwords to other social media websites, such as
blogs."
b. The Uncertain Future and Application of Federal Legislation Is
Also an Inadequate Solution to Protect Constitutional Privacy
Interests
In addition to the states' response to this practice, SNOPA was
introduced in Congress on April 27, 2012. Although the bill died
when Congress adjourned in 2012, it has been reintroduced for the
2013 term." The 2013 bill covers any employer, whether private or
public, and it covers university admissions. It prohibits any
employer from "requir[ing] or request[ing] that an employee or
applicant for employment provide the employer with a user name,
password, or any other means for accessing a private email account of
the employee or applicant or the personal account of the employee or
95. Maryland was the first state to enact a password protection law on May 2, 2012.
See Goemann, supra note 4. As of February 21, 2014, at least 39 states have enacted or are
considering enacting social media protection laws. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 76 (listing the states considering legislation in 2014, and the
states that already passed legislation in 2013 and 2012).
96. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (2013).
97. See supra Part I (explaining social media is a broad, user-driven, interactive
platform which allows users to create and exchange information, whereas social
networking is a subset of social media which allows for the creation and exchange of user-
generated conduct through personal profiles).
98. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 5050, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012).
See also Joanna Stern, Legislation Would Make it Illegal for Employers to Ask for Passwords,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/snopa-law-make-illegal-
employers-passwords-reintroduced-congress/story?id=18422329#.UVUeVcOTkuc.
99. Social Networking Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
100. Id. at g§ 3, 5(1).
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applicant on any social networking website."'o' It also imposes
penalties on employers who "discharge, discipline, discriminate. . . or
deny employment or promotion ... or threaten to take any such
action against" the employee if the employee "refuses or declines" to
provide the information, makes a complaint, institutes a proceeding,
or testifies.'2
While SNOPA may be adequate to protect the privacy of social
media information, this congressional response still poses problems.
First, it is unclear whether Congress will in fact pass the bill. If
Congress fails to pass SNOPA, applicants would be required to rely
on the incomplete patchwork of state laws or rely on federal laws. It
is unclear, though, that any existent federal law provides sufficient
protection because none are specifically targeted at employers in the
context of social media. For instance, the most relevant federal
statute protecting electronic disclosures is the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA").' 3 The SCA, however, is outdated
and has not responded to the expansion of modern electronic
communications, such as social media.'" One of the principal
condemnations of the SCA is that it has "fail[ed] to provide a clear
framework for understanding whether a user has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his communications stored in the cloud."'0
Moreover, lower courts are confused about its applicability to social
media.'" Another federal statute, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), also provides tangential protection to applicants by
providing notice and consent requirements for background checks,
but it only applies to third-party screening companies."0 Thus, it is
101. Id. at § 2(a)(1).
102. Id. at § 2(a)(b).
103. To be fair, there are varied legislative protective measures that have been
granted. For instance, in regulating government record keeping, Congress has passed The
Privacy Act of 1974 and the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988. In
addition, Congress has enacted The Fair Credit Reporting Act, which protects information
obtained by the credit reporting industry. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost & Found in
Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153,
1119-1210 (1997).
104. See Lindsay S. Feuer, Who is Poking Around Your Facebook Profile?: The Need
to Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack of Privacy on Social
Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 511 (2011).
105. Id. at 496 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
106. See generally id. at 499-502.
107. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2014). See also Nathan J. Ebnet,
Note, It Can Do More than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
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unclear whether these statutes could adequately protect
constitutional privacy interests implicated by public employer social
media searches.
Second, though the focus of this Note is limited to informational
privacy in the context of public employers requiring disclosure of
social media usernames and passwords, it must be remembered that
this is only a small facet of the informational privacy debate.'"
Potential threats to informational privacy have been identified in
numerous areas such as medical records,'" financial information,"o
electronic filing,"' and the Internet in general. 2 Privacy protection
targeted at specific threats does not do away with the greater,
overarching informational privacy dilemma.
Notably, commentators have argued that legislative solutions are
an insufficient means of protecting privacy rights."' The ambit of
legislation is often very narrow and targeted. As indicated above, a
patchwork of legislation addresses some aspects of informational
privacy, but the protections are by no means sufficiently
Employment Screening With the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 97 MINN. L. REV. 306, 308
(2012).
108. Although concerns surrounding the right to informational privacy are much
broader than simply protecting social media username and password privacy, this Note is
limited to discussion of social media privacy.
109. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
(explaining that "[t]here can be no question that an employee's medical records, which
may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials
entitled to privacy protection").
110. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that a privacy
interest in financial information is significant but also noting that the fact that the plaintiffs
are state senators matter in this determination).
111. See generally Kyla Kitajima, Electronic Filing and Informational Privacy, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563 (2000) (discussing the informational privacy problems in
electronic filing).
112. See Lin, supra note 20, at 1090 (arguing that "a constitutional right to
informational privacy is necessary and appropriate for protecting privacy on the
Internet").
113. Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational
Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 134 (1991) (noting that "[t]he inherent conflict between the
government as 'collector' and the government as 'protector' casts doubt on the efficacy of
relying on state and federal legislatures to protect individuals' interest in informational
privacy"). See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1538
(2000) ("It is already far too late to prevent the invasion of cameras and databases.... No
matter how many laws are passed, it will prove quite impossible to legislate away the new
surveillance tools and databases. They are here to stay.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
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comprehensive.H4 One of the major issues in protecting privacy in a
technological age is the rapid pace at which technology develops. It is
difficult for legislatures to quickly respond to the threats posed by
emerging technology."' Although the federal and state governments
are responding to the problem of employers requesting social media
usernames and passwords, it is possible that these bills may be
rendered obsolete when new forms of technology are created."
c. Recognizing a Broader Constitutional Protection is the Best Way to
Safeguard Informational Privacy Rights in Social Media and Online
Information
The better solution to protect social media privacy rights is
recognizing informational privacy as a constitutional right under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This would allow public employees to
challenge government practices when state and/or federal protections
are inadequate.
1. Origins of the Right to Privacy
Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis, the "fathers of
privacy law,""' famously noted that the right to privacy is "the right to
be let alone."' The right to privacy provides "rights as against the
world""9 and is separated into two areas: common law tort privacy
and constitutional privacy.12 Under the common law, there are four
torts that violate an individual's privacy rights: "(1) Intrusion upon
the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2)
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3)
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4)
Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name
114. See Gindin, supra note 103, at 1196 (noting that Congress has enacted statutes "in
a piecemeal fashion to address specific privacy needs").
115. See William Jeremy Robinson, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy
Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (2010) (explaining that it is
difficult for legislatures to "keep up with the pace of change in computer networking....
[because] [b]y the time legislatures or courts figure out how to deal with a new product of
service, the technology has already progressed").
116. The SCA exemplifies the failings of Congress to respond to technology changes
because it was developed around technology in 1986. Id.
117. Lin, supra note 20, at 1094.
118. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
119. Id. at 213.
120. McAdam, supra note 23, at 55.
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or likeness.""' In contrast, under constitutional privacy, protections
are afforded to "personal information, individual autonomy, and
searches and seizures."'22 Although there is no explicit mention of the
right to privacy in the Constitution,'" the Supreme Court has
recognized the right to privacy through several interpretations of the
Bill of Rights. The Court's initial recognition of the right to privacy
centered around property rights. 24 Initially, the Court found a right
to privacy only under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,'2 5 and then
under the First Amendment.126 The most contentious area of privacy
rights under the Constitution, however, has been under the
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-the
focus of this Note.
2. The Supreme Court Has Neglected Defining the Scope and
Application of Informational Privacy
Two rights are at play under the constitutional right to privacy:
decisional privacy and informational privacy.'27 Decisional privacy
ensures personal autonomy in making personal decisions, while
informational privacy relates to ensuring confidentiality in
information." While the Supreme Court recognizes and protects
decisional privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
not protected informational privacy.
At the inception of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court
focused on decisional privacy. In the landmark decision Griswold v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized a generalized
121. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
122. Id. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (noting a right to privacy of
information which includes an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure or personal
matters"); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (noting the right to privacy protects
"matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing, and education"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting the beginnings of the Fourth Amendment recognition of a
"reasonable expectation of privacy").
123. Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.
124. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 765 (2004).
125. Id.
126. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1374-
91(1992).
127. Some have argued that the courts should be focusing on autonomy rights rather
than focusing on a distinction between informational and decisional privacy. See Suter,
supra note 124, at 1096.
128. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
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constitutional right to privacy.29 In Griswold, the Court held that a
statute criminalizing the sale of contraceptives to married couples was
unconstitutional.'" The Court rooted its decision on the notion that
the "Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 3 ' The effect
of recognizing this privacy right was to credit the understanding that
personal liberties were fundamentally important under the
Constitution.132
The Supreme Court expanded its right to privacy doctrine in
another landmark case, Roe v. Wade.3 3  In Roe, the Court
acknowledged that the right to privacy is founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty." The Court invoked the
substantive due process theory in its decision,' which is analyzed
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 Roe
specifically recognized the right to have an abortion as a fundamental
right entitled to constitutional privacy protections.3  However, the
Court also noted that the right to privacy was not absolute.'3" Rather,
"where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified by a compelling
state interest, and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."'39 Since Roe,
the Court has identified the following as fundamental rights under
decisional privacy: "marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, education" and "certain intimate
conduct."140 These decisions indicated a shift in the Court towards
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130. Id. at 485-86.
131. Id. at 484 (noting that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
contain privacy implications which formed the basis for a general constitutional right to
privacy).
132. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he right of privacy is a fundamental
personal right, emanating 'from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live."') (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961)).
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. Id. at 153.
135. See Jed S. Crumbo, Constitutional Law-Right to Privacy-Government Contract
Employees' Right to Informational Privacy, 79 TENN. L. REv. 417, 422 (2012).
136. Id.
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
138. Id. at 155.
139. Id. at 155-56 (internal citations omitted).
140. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).
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recognizing a broader scope of personal information under the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized decisional privacy
interests, the Court's stance in the realm of informational privacy is
less clear. In 1977, for the first time, the Court tangentially addressed
the right to informational privacy in two cases: Whalen v. Roe and
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.141 While the Court in
both cases identified the existence of a right to informational privacy,
the Court did not define the scope of the right.42
In Whalen, the issue before the Court was whether New York
violated privacy interests by maintaining a centralized computer
database that contained the names and addresses of individuals who
obtained certain prescription drugs.143  The Court recognized that
there are two types of privacy interests: (1) "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters;"'" and (2) "the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."145
Lower courts have acknowledged the first privacy interest-avoiding
disclosure of personal matters-as the Supreme Court's recognition
of the right to informational privacy.146  In relation to the
informational privacy claim, the plaintiffs argued that the availability
of the information created concern that the information would
become publically known and negatively impact their reputations.47
Ultimately, the Whalen Court did not find that New York's database
collection program violated the Constitution because the security
provisions were adequate to protect against unwarranted disclosures,
and certain disclosures were already required under other law.'4
The Court acknowledged in Whalen that it was "not unaware of
the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
141. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 600 (1977).
142. See Crumbo, supra note 135, at 420 n.24 (noting that "the courts of appeals have
been unable to develop uniform jurisprudence across the circuits and have adopted
substantially different approaches to analyzing and deciding informational privacy cases").
143. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
144. Id. at 599 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 599-600 (footnote omitted).
146. Lin, supra note 20, at 1094.
147. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
148. Id. at 600-02; see, e.g., id. at 602 n.29 (explaining that there are existing "statutory
reporting requirements relating to venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by deadly
weapons, and certifications of fetal death").
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government files."'49 However, the Court noted that it did not need
to decide "any question which might be presented by the
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data whether
intentional or unintentional or by a system that did not contain
comparable security provisions." 0 Thus, the Court explicitly chose
not to address the issue of whether similar statutes would violate a
constitutional right to informational privacy.
Four months after the Whalen decision, the Supreme Court
decided another informational privacy case, Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services. The Nixon case involved a lawsuit by President
Richard Nixon challenging the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act, which would have required President Nixon to turn
over his tape recordings and presidential papers for review."' The
Court found that Nixon's interest in retaining his tape recordings was
weaker than the claim in Whalen.'52 The Court found that President
Nixon had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his "private
communications."' However, after weighing President Nixon's
privacy interest against the public interest in subjecting administrative
materials to archival screening, the Court found the public interest to
be paramount.54  Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not find a
violation of President Nixon's informational privacy rights.
Nixon and Whalen made significant pronouncements in the area
of informational privacy. First, the Supreme Court noted that there
are two situations when informational privacy is applicable-
government collection of information and dissemination of
information."' Second, the Court noted that although an expectation
of privacy exists for private information,156 the expectation is
diminished when the information is regularly disclosed to third
parties."' Third, the Court identified an interest-balancing approach
when evaluating informational privacy claims, where the interest of
149. Id. at 605.
150. Id. at 605-06.
151. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 429-33 (1977).
152. Id. at 459.
153. Id. at 458-59.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 599 n.24 (noting that the right to informational privacy "applies both when
an individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive information to the government and
when an individual seeks assurance that such information will not be made public").
156. Id. at 455-58.
157. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
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the state is weighed against the interest against disclosure.' The
Court's opinions in Whalen and Nixon seemed to indicate a departure
from the traditional right to privacy analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The Court had previously suggested in Paul v. Davis
that zones of privacy analysis might be necessary when assessing a
right to privacy claim against the right of the government to require
disclosure.'6
After Nixon and Whalen, the Supreme Court did not address
informational privacy rights for thirty years. In 2010, the Court
decided National Aeronautics & Space Administration v. Nelson,
which brought the issue back.16' This case involved the California Jet
Propulsion Laboratory ("JPL"), a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration ("NASA") facility.162 NASA is an independent
federal agency that oversees the federal government's "space
activities."'63  JPL is operated by the California Institute of
Technology under a government contract, but is staffed only by
contract employees.? Prior to 2007, JPL employees were not
required to undergo background checks for employment.' The issue
in this case arose from a recommendation made by the 9/11
Commission requiring a uniform identification standard, which would
require all employees with long-term access to federal facilities to
158. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. See Colin M. O'Brien,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, Background Investigation, and Informational
Privacy Rights, 80 Miss. L.J. 299, 325-26 (2010) (Noting that Nixon and Whalen identified
the following interests: (1) the nature of the information collected or disseminated-the
more commonly this information is disclosed by the individual, the weaker the individual's
interest in protecting his or her privacy; (2) the scope of the information collected in
comparison to the scope of information in which the individual has a privacy interest; (3)
the existence of safeguards to protect against the unauthorized dissemination of the
collected information will weigh in favor of the government; and (4) the availability of
practical alternative means of achieving the government's purpose in collecting or
disseminating the information.) (internal citations omitted).
159. See Helen L. Gilbert, Minor's Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 1375, 1380 (2007).
160. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (noting that publically posting a
photograph of the defendant did not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment because it did
not fall within a zone of privacy).
161. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
162. Id. at 751-52.
163. Id. at 751.
164. Id. at 752.
165. Id. (noting that only federal civil servants had been required to undergo
background checks, not contract employees).
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submit to a background check.f" Any JPL employee who refused to
comply would face termination.'67 The process entailed filling out two
documents: (1) SF-85, a questionnaire; and (2) Form 42.16 SF-85
requested biographical information, information about citizenship,
military status, and whether the employee had "'used, possessed,
supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs' in the last year." 69 If the
employee answered "yes" to the drug-affiliation question, the
employee was required to provide information about any treatment
or counseling he or she received.o Form 42 was a reference sheet,
which was meant for the JPL employee's landlords and references."
The reference sheet asked questions about the references' knowledge
of the employees, such as the employee's drug use, unlawful conduct,
financial integrity, mental health, and general conduct.72
Before the case went to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that mandatory disclosures of drug use,
possession, supply, and manufacture were "necessary to further the
compelling interest" in combating illegal drug use."' However, it
found that the portion of the SF-58 questionnaire requiring disclosure
of drug treatment and counseling likely violated the Constitution."'
The Ninth Circuit noted that the government had not provided any
compelling interest for requiring disclosure, especially since treatment
and counseling would create a lesser need for disclosure."' Further,
the Ninth Circuit found Form 42's open-ended questions to be
particularly problematic.7 6 Not only did the questions implicate the
right to privacy, but the disclosure requirements were not narrowly
tailored to meet the government's purported interests of ensuring the
security of its facilities and verifying the identity of its contractors.
When Nelson finally came before the Supreme Court, the Court
again refrained from providing further guidance or specific contours
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 752-53.




173. Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 879 (9th Cir. 2008).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 880.
177. Id.
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on whether there is a constitutional right to informational privacy.17 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Samuel Alito held that, for purposes of
SF-85 and Form 42, the Privacy Act's safeguards against public
disclosure were sufficient to protect the JPL employees. 179  For
purposes of the decision, the Court assumed that the rights at issue
"implicate[d] a privacy interest of constitutional significance."'"
However, the Court declined to provide any further guidance or clear
answer on the informational privacy claim, simply stating that it
"assumed without deciding" whether the right existed.' Although
the Court's ultimate holding was unanimous, the Court differed in its
rationale. Both Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas argued
that a federal constitutional right to informational privacy does not
exist.'8
Pertinent to this Note, a significant portion of the opinion is the
Court's emphasis of the government's decision-making role. The
Court noted that the government acting as an employer, rather than a
sovereign, had a significant interest in conducting background checks
of its employees.' The Court grants much higher deference to the
government when the government acts as an employer making
managerial decisions in running their place of employment, than
when the government acts as law enforcement.18
3. Without Guidance From the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts Have
Developed an Unclear and Fragmented Patchwork of Informational
Privacy Doctrine
With the exception of the D.C. Circuit, all of the circuit courts8 1
have recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy.'
Despite recognizing this right, however, the circuit courts are
178. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) (holding
"that the challenged portions of the Government's background check do not violate [the
right to informational privacy]" and again "assum[ing], without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon").
179. Id. at 757.
180. Id. at 756.
181. Id. at 751.
182. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 758.
184. Id. at 757-58.
185. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. v. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Servs., 118 F.3d 786, 788
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that there are "grave doubts" about whether a constitutional right
to informational privacy exists).
186. See Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1381 n.44.
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fragmented on their approach in addressing the issue. As in Whalen
and Nixon, there are two steps in the analytic framework of the
circuit courts." First, the courts determine whether a privacy right
exists in either the collection or dissemination of information.
Second, if a privacy interest is implicated, the circuit courts then
weigh the privacy interest against disclosure in light of the
government collecting or distributing the information."' In
addressing each step, the circuit courts have adopted a variety of
approaches for each step.
A circuit court will first ask whether an individual's privacy right
is implicated. The majority of circuit courts have broadly interpreted
the right of informational privacy.'" These courts ask whether an
individual has a "reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation of privacy,
and then assess whether the interest is of a sufficiently personal
nature to infringe on their expectation of privacy.'9' Under this
approach, the circuit courts have recognized several categories of
information that should be entitled to constitutional protection:"
* ** 13 * * * 194 ** 195medical information,' financial information, sexual information,
and certain personal information, such as social security numbers."
187. See O'Brien, supra note 158, at 326 (noting that the courts generally "(1)
determin[e] if an individual's privacy interest is implicated by the collection or
dissemination of information; and (2) if so, weigh[] the governmental interest in collection
or dissemination of that information against the individual interests in avoiding
disclosure.").
188. See, e.g., Kalistrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1062-64 (first evaluating
whether there were privacy interests in the plaintiffs' personal security and bodily
integrity).
189. See e.g., id. at 1064-65 (evaluating second whether the plaintiff's interest
outweighs the government interest); see also O'Brien, supra note 158, at 326. This
approach is akin to the approach adopted in Nixon and Whalen. See id. at 325.
190. See Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1382 nn.53 - 59 (synthesizing lists of numerous
cases where lower courts applied informational privacy rights to a wide spectrum of
information).
191. Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1832. See Jeffery S. Grand, The Blooding of America:
Privacy & the DNA Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2313-14 (2002). See also
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1987) ("In
determining whether information is entitled to privacy protection, we have looked at
whether it is within an individual's reasonable expectations of confidentiality.").
192. O'Brien, supra note 158, at 333-35.
193. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)
("There can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may contain
intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to
privacy protection.").
194. Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978).
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However, the Sixth Circuit's approach is more limited.'" In fact,
the Sixth Circuit appears to grant the least amount of protection to
informational privacy rights" by recognizing the right to privacy only
in cases that implicate fundamental rights or other constitutional
provisions.1 For instance, the Sixth Circuit recognized an
informational privacy violation in Kallstrom v. City of Columbus
where a group of police officers involved in a high-profile gang
prosecution sued the City of Columbus.2 " The officers claimed the
City of Columbus violated their right to privacy by distributing
sensitive personal information (including phone numbers, driver's
licenses, and family members' names, addresses, and phone numbers)
to a defense attorney, who then disseminated the information to
several gang members.201 The Sixth Circuit held that the
dissemination of the officers' information implicated their privacy
interests because such dissemination endangered the officers' and
their families' lives, thus violating fundamental liberty interests in
personal security and bodily integrity that is recognized by the
Supreme Court.2 0 Other fundamental rights recognized by the
Supreme Court 203 include: child rearing,2 family relationships,2
195. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 1998). See Walls v. City of Petersburg,
895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).
196. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "the
indiscriminate public disclosure" of Social Security numbers could implicate a
constitutional informational privacy right, but ultimately concluding that the government's
interest in making bankruptcy documents available to the public outweighed
nondisclosure). See also Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062-63 (noting that there is an interest in
protecting personal security and bodily integrity).
197. O'Brien, supra note 158, at 328.
198. See Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 260 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
Sixth Circuit has only recognized an informational privacy interest in two situations: "(1)
where the release of personal information could lead to bodily harm ... and (2) where the
information released was of a sexual, personal, and humiliating nature") (internal citations
omitted).
199. Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1382-83. See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
Cnty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that "this Court has not strayed from
its holding, and continues to evaluate privacy claims based on whether the interest sought
to be protected is a fundamental interest or an interest implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"). This approach has been interpreted from the Supreme Court's opinion in Paul
v. Davis. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (noting that marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education are fundamental rights).
200. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1059.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1062.
203. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.
204. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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contraception,' procreation,2 0 and marriage."' In the context of
informational privacy on social media, the restrictive nature of the
fundamental rights approach is likely too limited. It fails to account
for a host of information that the Supreme Court has not yet
considered "fundamental" but, nonetheless, implicates significant
privacy concerns, such as an individual's HIV status or other medical
information, which might be accessible on social media.20
The Eighth Circuit's approach somewhat mirrors the restrictive
view of the Sixth Circuit, but is slightly more inclusive and contains
language that follows the majority of the circuits. 210  Like the Sixth
Circuit, the Eighth Circuit applies the informational privacy right to
fundamental rights, but also applies the right to matters involving
"highly personal medical or financial information."21' However, the
Eight Circuit restricts right to privacy claims to violations that are of
"shocking degradation or.. . egregious humiliation." 212 Similar to the
limited reach of the "fundamental rights" approach of the Sixth
Circuit, the Eighth Circuit's approach is also restrictive and might not
reach information that other circuit courts protect, such as medical
health records.213
After the courts recognize a right to informational privacy, the
second step in the inquiry is to assess the level of scrutiny attached to
government intervention in that area. A majority of circuit courts
utilize a balancing test 214 to determine if the societal interest in
205. Prince v. Massachusettes, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
206. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
207. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
208. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
209. See Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1382-83 (noting the broader coverage of the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" approach).
210. There have been instances where the Eighth Circuit has used the legitimate
expectation language utilized by a majority of the Circuit Courts. See, e.g., Eagle v.
Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (1996) (noting that determining privacy violations requires
"examin[ing] the nature of the material opened to public view to assess whether the
person had a legitimate expectation that the information would remain confidential while
in the state's possession."). However, the Eighth Circuit's language is limited by the
requirement that the disclosure amounts to a "shocking degradation." O'Brien, supra
note 158, at 330 n.150.
211. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1993).
212. Eagle, 88 F.3d at 625 (quoting Alexander, 993 F.2d at 1350).
213. Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1383.
214. See Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[W]here the privacy
right is invoked to protect confidentiality, a balancing standard is appropriate as opposed
to the compelling state interest analysis involved when autonomy of decisionmaking is at
issue."); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)
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disclosure outweighs the privacy interest.215 Courts have derived the
balancing approach from the Supreme Court's decisions in Whalen
and Nixon.216 In balancing these interests, many of the courts apply
some or all of the factors highlighted by the Third Circuit in United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.217 At issue before the Third
Circuit in Westinghouse was whether an employer was required to
comply with a government subpoena that requested medical records
of its employees during an investigation, and charged the employer
with maintaining hazardous materials.218 The Third Circuit held that
the public interest in the government's investigation was sufficient to
require disclosure; however, the government was required to notify
the employees whose records were sought for examination and those
employees were allowed to raise privacy claims.219 Commentators
have viewed this balancing approach as a type of intermediate
scrutiny.220 The Westinghouse factors include:
(1) [T]he type of record requested; (2) the
information it does or might contain; (3) the potential
for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure;
(4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of
safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the
degree of need for access; and (6) whether there is an
express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or
other recognizable public interest militating toward
221
access.
("[W]e must engage in the delicate task of weighing competing interests."); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e believe that the balancing test, more
common to due process claims, is appropriate here.").
215. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578 (noting that "[i]n the cases in which a
court has allowed some intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding medical records, it
has usually done so only after finding that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the
privacy interest on the specific facts of the case."). See also Grand, supra note 191, at 2316
(noting that the circuits employing the balancing approach vary on "whether the
government interest must be legitimate, compelling, substantial, or merely described as a
general interest").
216. See Fajdo, 633 F.2d at 1176.
217. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570.
218. Id. at 573.
219. Id. at 581.
220. O'Brien, supra note 158, at 338 (internal citations omitted).
221. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579.
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In contrast to the balancing approach used by a majority of the
circuit courts, the Sixth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits222 -as well as
those circuit courts that utilize the fundamental rights approach-
apply a strict scrutiny analysis to informational privacy rights deemed
fundamental.2 Under a strict scrutiny approach, the government
must show a compelling interest and that the law or regulation is
narrowly tailored to meet the government's interest.224
III. The Supreme Court Must Recognize a Constitutional Right
to Informational Privacy
Thus far, this Note has illustrated one significant problem in the
realm of informational privacy-potential government access to
social media accounts containing sensitive, private information.
However this is only one small facet of the informational privacy
debate. Our online presence is expansive and will only continue to
expand as technology advances. Therefore, this Note argues that the
Supreme Court should recognize a constitutional right to
informational privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Not only
would this clarify the scope of this important right among the
fragmented circuit courts, but it also would provide for greater
information security when access to this information is growing faster
than ever before.
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court apply: (1) the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" standard to determine if an
informational privacy right is implicated; and (2) if an informational
privacy right is implicated, that the Court apply the "intermediate
scrutiny" balancing test adopted by the Third Circuit in Westinghouse.
First, the "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard should be
employed because it is more deferential to precedent than the
"fundamental rights" approach employed by the Sixth Circuit. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Whalen and Nixon indicate that the
privacy interest in confidentiality extends beyond the "fundamental
222. Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1386 n.81 (citing Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136
F.3d 1055, 1064 (6th Cir. 1998); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir.
1990) (internal citation omitted).
223. See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686 (6th Cir. 1998). See also O'Brien,
supra note 158, at 337.
224. Bloch, 156 F.3d at 686. See Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1065 (reasoning that the
government had an interest in public disclosure of agency records but disclosing extensive
information, such as family member names, driver's licenses, and phone numbers, to a
defense attorney were not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interests). See also
Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1387.
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rights" listed in the Court's opinion in Paul."' Further, as previously
discussed, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' fundamental rights-focused
approaches are too limited. Finally, the "legitimate expectation of
privacy" approach is a useful standard to determine if a privacy
concern is implicated because it is flexible and has room to account
for societal changes.226
In applying the "legitimate expectation of privacy standard" to
the social media context, the Supreme Court should be aware of the
public and private profile options on many social media websites,
such as Facebook. 27 Public profile searches pose different privacy
concerns than private searches precisely because the user has not
chosen to limit the information available to the public. Thus, based
on the "legitimate expectation of privacy standard" proposed by this
Note, this distinction between "private" and "public" profiles matters;
private profiles would be protected, but public profiles would not. 228
Second, the balancing approach adopted in Westinghouse,229 as a
form of intermediate scrutiny, is also ideal because it provides
sufficient room to address both government and individual interests.
This portion of the test will balance the government's interest in
acquiring the information against the individual's right to
confidentiality in that information. Most significantly, this test is in
accordance with the Supreme Court's prior precedents in Roe and
Whalen, in which the Court also engaged in balancing inquiries.'
Finally, it does not appear that the Court's decision in Nelson
would preclude a finding that a right to informational privacy exists.
Though the Court chose not to hold that a right to informational
privacy existed, the Court did not foreclose a finding of this right in
225. See Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Gilbert, supra
note 159, at 1387.
226. For instance, fifty years ago individuals may not have considered that there
should be privacy in cellular phone "text-messaging" communication, because the
technology did not exist. However, the legitimate expectation of privacy approach may
allow for recognition of "text-messaging" communication now because the technology is
widely used.
227. See supra Part I.A.
228. Public profiles are considered to be in the public domain. Courts consider this
"fair game." Ebnet, supra note 107, at 325.
229. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3d Cir. 1980).
230. See Gilbert, supra note 159, at 1387 (suggesting that this approach "may best
track the Supreme Court's balancing of factors in both Whalen and Nixon.").
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the future. Rather, the Court seemed to punt the issue for another
day.23
Conclusion
Individuals need safeguards against government interference
with personal information. Public employer requests for an
applicant's social media information create constitutional privacy
concerns. The widespread use of social media and the concentration
of information available online have changed privacy norms. The
potential for a breach in information security, whether simply from
the government possessing the information or accidental government
disclosures, highlights the need for heightened protection.232
Although state and legislative solutions attempt to address the
problems posed by employer access to social media information, the
protection is still inadequate for the reasons indicated in this Note.
Thus, the Supreme Court should recognize a constitutional right to
informational privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure
more comprehensive protection of information in our ever-expanding
technological age.
231. Nat'1 Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) ("We
assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort
mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.").
232. See Chlapowski, supra note 113, at 134.
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